Elections should be structured to provide convincing affirmative evidence that the reported outcomes actually reflect how people voted. This can be accomplished with a combination of software-independent voting systems, compliance audits, and risk-limiting audits.
I
deally, what should an election do? Certainly, it should find out who won, but we believe it also should produce convincing evidence that it found the real winners-or report that it can't. This isn't automatic; it requires thoughtful design of voting equipment, carefully planned and implemented voting and vote-counting processes, and rigorous postelection auditing.
The systems and processes currently deployed in the US often fail to meet this goal, due to shortcomings of the equipment, gaps in processes, and failures to audit effectively. The first essential requirement is voting equipment that produces a trustworthy audit trail that can be used to confirm that the votes were recorded and tabulated correctly. Given the present state of technology, this means the voting system must produce a tangible, physical record of the vote that can be checked by the voter for accuracy and retained for auditing purposestypically, a voter-verifiable paper record (VVPR).
Currently, approximately 25 percent of US voters use paperless electronic voting machines that don't produce such a record. 1 Because paperless electronic voting machines rely on complex software and hardware, and because there's no feasible way to ensure that the voting software is free of bugs or that the hardware is executing the proper software, there's no guarantee that electronic voting machines record votes accurately. And, because paperless voting machines preserve only an electronic record of the vote that can't be directly observed by voters, there's no way to produce convincing evidence that the electronic record accurately reflects voters' intent. Internet voting shares the shortcomings of paperless electronic voting machines and has additional vulnerabilities.
Numerous electronic voting equipment failures have been documented. Paperless voting machines in Carteret County, North Carolina, irretrievably lost 4,400 votes; other machines in Mecklenburg, North Carolina, recorded 3,955 more votes than the number of people who voted; in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, machines recorded 2,700 more votes than voters; in Mahoning County, Ohio, some machines reported a negative total vote count; and in Fairfax, Virginia, county officials found that for every 100 or so votes cast for one candidate, the electronic voting machines subtracted one vote for her. 2 In short, when elections are conducted on paperless voting machines, there's no way to produce convincing evidence that the right candidate won.
VVPRs are important, but they aren't a panacea. If these records aren't examined after the election, then their value is eliminated. For instance, in 13 states, a
Evidence-Based Elections
Currently, states generally require jurisdictions to use voting systems that have been tested against a federal or state standard. Historically, these standards were written primarily for electromechanical voting systems, such as lever machines, paper ballots, and punch card voting systems. However, the trend over the past decade or two has been toward more sophisticated, complex technology and much greater reliance on complex software-trends that voting standards and the testing process have been slow to react to. Perhaps as a result, independent studies of deployed voting software have found major design defects and security vulnerabilities. For instance, one study commissioned by the state of Ohio found pervasive security flaws of sufficient severity that the researchers concluded the equipment would need "fundamental and broad reengineering" to support the goal of guaranteeing trustworthy elections. Flaws included default passwords, unprotected software upgrade functionality, and defects that would allow a single individual-with no insider access-to introduce a malicious virus that spreads from voting machine to machine and silently changes votes. 3 More than a dozen independent studies have evaluated the security of fielded, certified voting systems, and each one found new, previously unknown security flaws that certification hadn't uncovered. One flaw was discovered independently at least three times by different security experts over a nine-year period (in 1997, 2003, and 2006 ) but was never caught by certification testing. 4 (Since then, the US Election Assistance Commission [EAC] has administered federal certification and made a number of changes to the process.) Accordingly, many computer scientists have called for tightened voting standards and a more rigorous certification process. [5] [6] [7] [8] The EAC has taken modest steps in this direction. For instance, the certification process is more stringent than ever, and the EAC is developing stricter standards for next-generation voting technology. However, a consequence of these changes is that the cost of certifying a voting system has risen dramatically. Although the time and costs of certification depend on many factors, generally speaking, federal certification testing can cost manufacturers about US$2-4 million to certify a new voting system and can take up to two years. 9 Some fear that the cost will rise even higher if future standards are adopted. [10] [11] [12] At the same time, the voting industry has consolidated: two companies now dominate the market, and the expense of certification testing makes it exceptionally difficult for new players to enter. Moreover, even these more exacting certification processes don't ensure that electronic vote records will accurately reflect the intent of the voters or that electronic vote records provide convincing evidence of the election's accuracy. We could reasonably ask whether the certification costs outweigh the benefits, let alone whether it's wise to make certification even more onerous.
Certification tries to prevent problems before they occur. The complexity of voting technology, software, and procedures makes it impossible even to enumerate all the features of the system and circumstances of use that might cause problems, much less to prevent all problems. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that certification tests new equipment under a limited range of conditions. Reliability and accuracy depend on how systems are maintained, configured, and deployed, as well as the particular procedures a jurisdiction follows. We argue that putting more emphasis on detecting and correcting errors and less on certification is both more economical and more effective at ensuring election integrity.
We sketch how evidence-based elections might be conducted, using several technical tools. The basic approach we advocate is simple: evidence = auditability + auditing.
In other words, the voting equipment must be auditable: it must produce a trustworthy audit trail that can be used to check the election's accuracy. In addition, election processes must incorporate auditing as part of the routine electoral process to produce and check evidence that the election found the right winners.
The technical name for the approach we advocate is resilient canvass framework. 13 This can be achieved by a strongly software-independent voting system, 14 which
Evidence that the voting system found the true winners matters more than evidence that, under laboratory conditions, it can count votes well.
provides auditability by generating an audit trail that can be used to find the actual winners, and two kinds of routine postelection audits-a compliance audit and a risklimiting audit. 13, [15] [16] [17] The compliance audit checks that the audit trail is sufficiently complete and accurate to tell who won. The risk-limiting audit checks the audit trail statistically to determine whether the vote-tabulation system found the correct winners and, with high probability, corrects the outcome if the system was wrong. All three components are crucial. The risk-limiting audit relies on the integrity of the audit trail, which was created by the software-independent voting system (the voters themselves, in the case of paper ballots) and checked for integrity by the compliance audit.
Strongly Software-Independent Voting Systems
A voting system is strongly software independent if an undetected error or change to its software can't produce an undetectable change in the outcome, and we can find the correct outcome without rerunning the election. 14 Strong software independence doesn't mean the voting system has no software; rather, it means that even if its software has a flaw that causes it to give the wrong outcome, the overall system still produces "breadcrumbs" (an audit trail) from which we can find the true outcome, despite any flaw in the software. Systems that produce VVPRs (for instance, voter-marked paper ballots) as an audit trail are strongly software independent, provided the integrity of that audit trail is maintained, because we can use the audit trail to determine who really won. Currently, the only systems that can confer software independence are systems with VVPRs. End-to-end cryptographic systems can provide software independence (in essence, tamper evidence) but by themselves don't give strong software independence. Voter-marked paper ballots are the best form of VVPR. Thermal paper print of the kind typically generated by direct-recording electronic voting machines (DREs) is particularly fragile and subject to spoilage.
Compliance Audits
The voting equipment is responsible for generating audit records (for example, VVPRs) that are trustworthy at the time they were generated. However, this isn't enough. We must also ensure that the records remain trustworthy at the time they're used in the audit.
Normally, we rely on other election processes to protect the audit trail, such as two-person chain-of-custody rules, tamper-evident seals, ballot accounting, and other procedural methods. The purpose of a compliance audit is to check whether these steps were properly followed. For instance, if the voting system relies on VVPRs to achieve strong software independence, the compliance audit is responsible for generating affirmative evidence that procedures have been followed so that the VVPRs will be a sufficiently accurate and complete record of voter intent to determine who won.
Ultimately, the purpose of a compliance audit is to generate convincing affirmative evidence that a full hand count of the audit trail would reflect the correct outcome of the election, as the votes were cast. If the election passes the compliance audit, we can proceed to the risk-limiting audit. However, if the compliance audit can't confirm that the audit trail is trustworthy, then the overall canvass process must be deemed a failure-it didn't produce convincing evidence that the election was decided correctly.
Compliance audits don't give ironclad proof that all procedures were faithfully followed, so the human element-poll workers and other people involved in running the election-remains an important part of election administration. Still, compliance audits can detect systemic procedural failures and help determine whether the audit trail is trustworthy.
A compliance audit might include the following steps:
■ Poll book accounting. Compare the number of voters who signed in to vote in each precinct to the number of ballots cast. Investigate and document discrepancies. ■ Ballot accounting. Check that the number of blank ballots distributed to each precinct matches the number of blank/spoiled ballots returned plus the number of ballots cast in that precinct. Check that the number of ballots voted by mail isn't greater than the number mailed to voters. ■ Chain-of-custody checks. Examine chain-of-custody signature logs. Confirm that cast ballots were never left unattended without video surveillance nor in the sole possession of any individual. ■ Security checks. Check seals, seal logs, and surveillance tapes. Voted ballots should be protected with tamperevident seals for transport to and storage at election headquarters. Check that seal procedures have been followed properly. For instance, the county might include a uniquely numbered seal in each precinct's supplies and record the numbers of the seals sent to each precinct. After the polls close, poll workers could apply the seal to the box of voted ballots before transport, photograph the applied seal, and upload the photograph to the county. When the box is received at a county collection center, county workers could check the seals and seal numbers and compare the seals to the photographs. If ballots need to be inspected as part of the audit, seal integrity can be checked again.
If seals are inadvertently broken or replaced or if other anomalies occur, these events should be logged. The compliance audit should check that these protocols have been followed. ■ Event log inspection. Check voting system logs, poll worker problem logs, and other materials. Many election offices might already conduct some or all of these checks.
To facilitate transparency and give the public convincing evidence that the election found the correct outcome, the compliance audit results should be made available to observers, candidates, and members of the public on request. Because none of this information can compromise the secrecy of the ballot, it can be published without endangering voter privacy. In addition, election officials should review the compliance audit results after each election and use them to continuously improve election procedures.
If the compliance audit discovers problems or gaps in the evidence, the next step is to determine which audit records are trustworthy and which might not be. This information can be fed into the risk-limiting audit. If the number of questionable or missing audit records is small enough that it can't alter the contest outcome, a risk-limiting audit might still be able to provide strong evidence of who won while treating the questionable or missing records in the most conservative way.
Risk-Limiting Audits
Risk-limiting audits involve quantifying the evidence that the reported electoral outcome is correct by manually inspecting parts of the audit trail-which the compliance audit has already confirmed is sufficiently accurate to determine who won. Typically, a risk-limiting audit examines more and more of the audit trail until the manual inspection generates convincing evidence that a full hand count of the audit trail would show the same outcome that the vote-tabulation system reported, or until it has examined the entire audit trail. If looking at a portion of the audit trail gives sufficiently strong evidence that a full hand count would confirm the outcome, the risk-limiting audit can stop-we have confidence that the reported winners are the real winners. If the audit ends up examining all ballots, effectively performing a 100 percent hand count, we can certify with confidence that the actual outcome is the outcome that the full hand count shows. Of course, audits aren't guaranteed to find all errors. Risk-limiting audits have a large chance of correcting the outcome if the outcome is wrong but don't promise to detect or correct errors that, aggregated, couldn't change the outcome. The confidence level-100 percent minus the risk limit-is a guaranteed lower bound on the probability that the audit will correct the outcome if the outcome is wrong, no matter why the outcome is wrong. We can use statistical methods to determine when the audit has achieved any desired confidence level, for instance, 90 percent (10 percent risk). In general, higher confidence levels (lower risk limits) require inspecting more records to obtain stronger evidence.
Other work in this issue gives simple methods for two basic types of risk-limiting audits. 17 One type, comparison audits, works by randomly selecting groups of ballots and comparing the vote subtotal from the vote-tabulation system for each group against a hand count of the votes in that group. Comparison audits are more efficient when the groups contain fewer ballots and most efficient when each group consists of a single ballot (ballot-level audits). Ballot-level comparison audits also increase transparency-it's much easier for auditors and observers to check whether a particular ballot shows a vote for a particular candidate than to verify that the votes in a group of dozens or hundreds of ballots were tabulated correctly.
Comparison audits place demands on vote-tabulation systems. The system must be able to report, in a useful format, the vote subtotals for each group of ballots. There's some flexibility in choosing how ballots are grouped (for instance, one can group ballots by precinct, separating those cast at the polling place from those cast by mail), but the groups must be defined so that all the ballots in a single group can be readily identified and retrieved without compromising voter privacy.
Current vote-tabulation systems make auditing unnecessarily difficult and expensive because they don't report vote subtotals for groups in a directly useful format and because they can't report results for arbitrarily small groups. In addition, most current systems can't report their interpretations of individual ballots, which is required for ballot-level comparison audits. Ballotpolling audits can be an economical alternative to comparison audits, at least when the margin of victory is not too small. 17 Ballot-polling audits do not require detailed reports from the vote-tabulation system.
Risk-limiting audits have been field tested in a number of jurisdictions, on contests of various types and sizes. In California, there have been audits in the counties of Alameda, Humboldt, Marin, Merced, Monterey, Napa, Orange, San Luis Obispo, Santa Cruz, Stanislaus, Currently, certification doesn't serve the interests of the public or local election officials as well as one might hope. 
Resilient Canvass Frameworks
Ideally, the overall election and canvass process should correct its own errors before announcing results, or report that it can't guarantee that it corrected its errors (for instance, because the compliance audit finds gaps in the chain of custody for many ballots or finds that there are far fewer cast ballots than poll book signatures). The three-part framework we describe-the combination of strongly software-independent voting systems, compliance audits, and risk-limiting audits-is designed to achieve exactly this goal. If the system fails the compliance audit, the process reports that it can't guarantee the correctness of the outcome; otherwise, a risk-limiting audit is conducted to check the election outcome and, with high probability, to correct the outcome if it's wrong. This notion has been formalized in the literature under the name resilient canvass framework. 13 A canvass framework (including humans, hardware, software, and procedures) is resilient if it has a known minimum chance of giving the correct election outcome-when it gives an outcome. Prior work shows that our proposed three-part framework achieves this goal. 13 Resilience combines two kinds of evidence, qualitative and quantitative. The compliance audit generates qualitative evidence, much like legal evidence. For instance, we might ask the compliance audit whether it is "beyond reasonable doubt" that the audit trail reflects the true outcome. The kind of evidence the compliance audit generates resists objective quantification.
The compliance audit can help us decide how much we can rely on the audit trail. For instance, if the compliance audit finds that a single innocent mistake could alter the outcome without leaving a trace in the audit trail-as is the case with paperless voting machinesthe evidence that the outcome is correct isn't persuasive. If the compliance audit discovers that the number of ballots missing or left unattended could account for the margin of victory several times over, the evidence that the outcome is correct is not persuasive. In contrast, if it would take dozens of bad actors, both insiders and outsiders, conspiring undetected, to alter the reported outcome and to alter the audit trail so that it reflects that wrong outcome, we can reasonably conclude that a full examination of the audit trail would reveal the true outcome.
The risk-limiting audit generates quantitative evidence. If the audit trail reflects the true outcome, it's straightforward in principle to find the minimum probability that the risk-limiting audit will correct the outcome if the outcome is wrong. The auditors control that probability by how they draw the sample and how they decide when to stop the audit. There are many rigorous methods for risk-limiting audits with varying requirements on voting systems, varying complexity levels, and varying efficiency levels. 13, [15] [16] [17] The Costs and Shortcomings of Voting System Certification Consider two related questions about vote tabulation:
1. Under laboratory conditions, can the vote-tabulation system-as delivered from the manufacturercount votes with a specified level of accuracy? 2. As maintained, deployed, and used in the current election, did the vote-tabulation system find the true winners?
We believe that question 2 is more important and that question 1 is interesting primarily insofar as it bears on question 2. Systems that can function accurately under ideal conditions might not function well as maintained, programmed, and deployed. While there is undeniable value in weeding out flawed voting systems before they can be used in an election, evidence that the voting system actually found the true winners ultimately matters more than evidence that, under laboratory conditions, it can count votes well. Voting system certification addresses question 1. Postelection audits address question 2.
Currently certified vote-tabulation systems make risk-limiting audits unnecessarily difficult, expensive, and opaque. The most efficient and transparent risklimiting audits involve comparing the system's interpretation of individual ballots to a human interpretation of the same ballots. However, no federally certified votetabulation system reports how it interpreted individual E-voting SEcurity ballots, making it difficult to conduct ballot-level audits. If a jurisdiction uses a certified vote-tabulation system, it will cost more to use it as a component of a resilient canvass framework because auditing will be more expensive, and the audit might be less convincing to observers than if the jurisdiction had used an uncertified system that supports efficient, transparent auditing.
Currently certified vote-tabulation systems can't report vote subtotals (in a useful, machine-readable format) for the sorts of groups of ballots needed to support efficient risk-limiting audits. For instance, they might be able to report vote subtotals by precinct, but because vote-by-mail ballots might not be sorted or retrievable by precinct, this isn't sufficient; tabulation systems often can't report vote subtotals for the groups that vote-bymail ballots are scanned in. Moreover, when these systems can report vote subtotals, the reports aren't designed for machine processing, and consequently, a great deal of hand editing is necessary to use them in an audit. Certified vote-tabulation systems can't report results for arbitrarily small groups of ballots; typically, they can generate reports for precincts subdivided by mode of voting (in person or by mail), but not smaller groups. Producing machine-readable reports for smaller groups-such as ballots scanned as a batch-might require only a few lines of SQL, but adding those lines to current systems would require recertification. As a result, the current requirement for certification impacts election integrity by making risk-limiting audits less efficient, less transparent, and more expensive.
Because currently certified systems make risk-limiting audits expensive, inefficient, and opaque, perhaps it would be better to allow the use of uncertified vote-tabulation systems (or systems certified to a less stringent standard) that are easier to audit, provided electoral outcomes are then checked with risk-limiting audits. An uncertified tabulation system that supports ballot-level auditing could increase both efficiency (fewer ballots need to be examined manually to attain the same level of confidence) and transparency (it's easier to observe whether a particular ballot shows a vote for a particular candidate than it is to observe whether a large number of ballots were tallied correctly).
In general, the current certification regime has drawbacks beyond its effect on auditing. The cost of certification adds to the cost of voting systems at a time when election officials have very tight budgets. The high cost of new voting systems locks jurisdictions into using old equipment long past its obsolescence. The cost of certification is a barrier to entry for competitors, especially for small players, and tilts the playing field to favor large vendors. This encourages consolidation, reducing the number of options available to election officials. The cost and time for recertification make it harder to patch bugs in certified systems or to add features. Also, because entire systems currently must be certified as a whole (there's no provision to certify a single component on its own), it's difficult to update the voting system's individual COTS components, such as digital scanners, which would be commodity items but for the certification requirement. Consequently, certification might inhibit innovation and efficiency in voting technology and increase up-front costs and maintenance costs.
A More Focused Role for Certification
We suggest that certification should focus on ensuring that a reliable audit trail is generated, rather than trying to ensure that votes are tabulated accurately-a role certification can't fulfill. Procedures required by laws and regulations can then ensure that the audit trail remains reliable throughout the canvass, that the reliability is confirmed by a compliance audit, and that the audit trail is in fact audited to generate convincing evidence that the reported outcome is correct-or to correct it.
Certification might be the best tool to address usability and accessibility, including ballot design and ballot presentation, to ensure that all voters can easily record their preferences. It might also be the best way to address some conditions required to maintain voter privacy, for instance, to guarantee that electronic voting machines don't inadvertently record information that could be used to link a particular voter to a particular ballot. Certification of vote-tabulation accuracy in the laboratory is less important, because the accuracy of tabulation in the current election can be checked after the fact. In contrast, presenting voters with a confusing ballot can't be rectified without rerunning the election. In addition, because many aspects of usability can't be measured in the field directly during a real election without violating voter privacy, usability can be measured only in advance in the laboratory.
Certification testing might also be the best tool to protect against failures that couldn't be recovered from at any acceptable cost. If a technology failure can prevent voters from marking, verifying, or casting their ballots, then certification should include reliability testing to minimize the frequency of that failure during elections. For instance, DREs with VVPRs would require careful testing to ensure that the voting machines are reliable enough that voters will be able to vote successfully. In contrast, because voters can continue to mark and cast paper ballots even in the event of a technology failure, optical scanners might not need reliability testing. As another example, because a failure of a votetabulation system that prevents election officials from reporting unofficial results on election night can cause bad publicity and loss of confidence, election officials might choose to include some level of reliability testing to check that the voting system will be able to tabulate votes on election night.
Further work will be required to define the appropriate roles of standards and testing in detail. Based on these principles, our framework might allow eliminating source code review, restrictions on coding conventions, and similar certification testing requirements. Certain elements proposed for next-generation voting standards-such as open-ended vulnerability testing; logic verification; and testing of setup inspection, cryptographic hardware, access control functionality, and other security features-might also be eliminated from the testing process.
For voting systems such as optically scanned votermarked paper ballots, in which voters can continue to vote even if the hardware or software fails, additional elements could be eliminated: volume testing, environmental testing and other forms of reliability testing, restrictions on the use of COTS components, and so on. However, for DREs and other systems whose failure would prevent voters from marking or casting their ballot on election day, reliability tests would still be needed.
Alternatively, vendors could self-assess or self-attest their compliance with such requirements, and regulators could monitor the voting systems' performance in the field. Vendors and test labs have found several of these elements-particularly source code review, openended vulnerability testing, and volume testing-to be especially expensive, 11, 12 so eliminating them from the testing regime could significantly reduce the cost of certification testing.
Other elements of the current and proposed testing regime would still be needed, including testing usability and accessibility and testing the core functional requirements for counting and tabulating votes and vote privacy properties. Test labs would also need to confirm that the voting system can meet the software independence requirement and can support efficient risk-limiting audits and compliance audits.
Election officials could decide whether the certification process retains testing of certain functional requirements, such as preelection programming, ballot design, and support for logic and accuracy tests, or whether to rely on other mechanisms for quality assurance, such as procurement processes, market competition, and in-the-field monitoring. Although testing these requirements isn't necessary for auditing and not required by our framework, election officials nonetheless might find such tests useful for purchase decisions.
In our view, laws should enunciate the basic requirements as principles: use a system that generates a reliable audit trail (use a strongly software-independent system); check that the audit trail remained reliable throughout the canvass (perform a compliance audit); and examine the audit trail in a way that has a large, prespecified chance of correcting the outcome before it's official if the outcome was wrong (perform a risk-limiting audit at a specific risk limit).
State regulations should then provide "safe harbor" methods and procedures, for example, by including a minimal checklist for compliance audits and guidelines for publishing election data, and spelling out a simple, step-by-step procedure for conducting a risk-limiting audit. 21 State regulations should also specify how to evaluate whether other proposed procedures meet the legal standard for jurisdictions that want to use procedures more closely tailored to their individual needs.
Federal or state agencies might act as clearinghouses for information about voting systems, including mandatory reports of failures of accuracy or reliability. They might still test equipment and software, to be able to endorse some systems as having performed reliably, preferably after field testing, not just laboratory testing. Such endorsements might save jurisdictions time, trouble, and money, while certification tends to increase local expenditures without necessarily producing better evidence that election outcomes are correct.
Mandating compliance and risk-limiting audits would give local election officials strong incentives to find the most accurate, reliable, and economical solution within their constraints-the more accurate the initial machine count, the less hand counting the audit would require. And because development, acquisition, and maintenance costs would be lower and more COTS components could be used, the entire system would provide stronger evidence at a lower cost to society and maintain the agility to adopt newer and better solutions quickly. That said, our proposal is a significant change from the status quo; to understand the cost and regulatory implications will require more study.
W
e believe that election law should require local election officials to give convincing evidence that election outcomes are correct. The call for "convincing evidence" raises the question, "convincing to whom?" We don't probe this question deeply here, but we think that the compliance audit should generate evidence that is convincing to "a reasonable person," a common legal standard. That is, after the compliance audit, it should be "beyond reasonable doubt" that the audit trail is adequately intact to determine the true winners; otherwise, the election has failed the compliance audit. The risk-limiting audit should provide strong, quantitative, statistical evidence-evidence that would convince anyone who understands the basis of the calculations or at least believes the theory behind them. The required strength of evidence-the risk limit or confidence level-can be set by legislation.
Providing convincing evidence doesn't require radical transparency of all election and canvass processes, but it does require a good audit trail, affirmative evidence that the audit trail is reliable, and adequate scrutiny of the audit trail to confirm that the votes were tabulated accurately enough to determine the true winners. To that end, we believe that there should be more focus on regulating procedures, especially the curation of the audit trail, and less focus on certifying tabulation equipment, in part because certification can never guarantee that votes are tabulated accurately in practice. How the system is maintained and deployed and how the data is handled are crucial. Requiring certification without mandating conditions of use provides little assurance that the tabulation is accurate. If the system generates a reliable audit trail and that trail is curated well, a risk-limiting audit can check whether-in the current election, given how the equipment was maintained and used-the votes in fact were tabulated accurately enough to determine the correct winners and can guarantee a large chance of correcting the results if not.
Currently, certification doesn't serve the interests of the public or local election officials as well as one might hope. It erects barriers to competition, increases acquisition and maintenance costs, slows innovation, and makes risk-limiting audits harder, slower, more expensive, and less transparent. And risk-limiting audits provide more direct evidence that outcomes are correct than certification can. Requiring local election officials to conduct compliance and risk-limiting audits rather than requiring them to use certified equipment would give them an additional incentive to use the most accurate (and most easily audited) tabulation technology available, because more accurate initial counts require less hand counting during the audit, reducing labor costs and allowing the canvass to finish sooner.
We believe that election integrity would be served best by laws and regulations that put incentives in the right place and that focus on evidence rather than equipment and software. Focusing on evidence entails more attention to creating, curating, and auditing the integrity of the audit trail, including requiring and checking seals and surveillance, chain-of-custody logs, ballot accounting, and other safeguards. Using voting systems that are designed to support efficient auditing-whether those systems have been certified or not-can substantially reduce the cost of collecting convincing evidence that the official results are correct. 
